Building on TAF2+: A practical vision for the next generation of UK trade advocacy

Recommendations drawing on a rapid review of lessons learned from TAF2+

With the UK aiming to build on and strengthen its legacy as a core provider of independent, trade‑related technical advice and capacity-building in international trade negotiations for developing countries, this paper offers suggestions for how future trade advocacy support could be made even more effective and responsive. We propose a non-exhaustive set of forward-looking design options for the next phase of UK trade advocacy, drawing on a rapid review of lessons learned from TAF2+ led by Cadmus.

The future of trade advocacy

The Trade and Investment Advocacy Fund 2 (TAF2+) filled a genuine need since its launch in 2017. [1] Few other programmes have offered long-term, demand-led assistance to developing-country negotiators to improve their ability to negotiate and participate in the multilateral system, independently of funders. Reviews of the programme have been broadly positive, finding that negotiations and logistical support were unique, responsive, and good value for money.

Where the support was strongest, it helped officials build firm, nuanced negotiating positions that they could hold and adapt as talks progressed. TAF2+ successfully promoted and catalysed interaction between developing countries, and between developing countries and other groups. The fund’s long-standing development of countries’ analytical capacities, strategy formulation, and ability to fund logistics and take part effectively in negotiations remains relevant.

However, much has changed in the decade since TAF2+ was launched. Geopolitical fragmentation and declining international cooperation have challenged trade multilateralism, while the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the global supply chain and inflationary crises, US tariffs, and a series of environmental and climate-related shocks have disrupted international commerce and economies and contributed to a fall in official development assistance (ODA) budgets. Services have resisted this trend, particularly in digitally deliverable trade.

In a volatile environment, many developing and least developed countries have negotiated hard and against the odds, asserting agency in the international sphere–including with support from TAF2+. Yet most still struggle to take part in the global trading system effectively, or even make their voices heard. Some don’t even have a seat at the table.

Support can be redesigned for the new era. A successor programme to TAF2+ should retain what has worked, build on achievements, and adapt to the new trade topography while leveraging the capabilities that have already been developed. The task is to carry over the strengths, adapting to the new context.

The new trade landscape

Multilateralism is stalling. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) fourteenth Ministerial Conference (MC14), in Yaoundé in March 2026, closed without a ministerial declaration or agreement on its headline goals, joining Seattle, Cancún, Buenos Aires and Abu Dhabi on the list of ministerial conferences that ended without significant progress. Consensus among 166 members is slow and easily blocked, as members pursue wider geopolitical objectives, and negotiations between countries in adversarial relationships become proxies for wider disputes. Some examples:

• At Yaoundé, a renewal of the moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions was upheld by all but a handful of members but blocked by two and lapsed for the first time since 1998.

• Negotiations on agriculture remain deadlocked and fisheries negotiations are slower than expected.

• The dispute settlement system still isn’t working properly. The Appellate Body remains unstaffed, and members rely on an interim appeal arrangement that covers 60% of world trade but not the whole membership. This disproportionately affects developing countries, which benefit most from a rules-based system.

For developing countries, this ongoing stasis limits what engagement at the WTO can achieve. However, they must continue to take part, not least because the opportunity costs of not doing so are high. Any definitive progress would clearly affect them, and no WTO member can afford not to be involved in the decision-making process while progress remains possible.

Negotiations on fish subsidies, accessions, special and differential treatment, WTO reform, and issues of direct national interest have potential. But with texts stalled and enforcement weakened, engagement increasingly involves defending positions and preventing damage rather than shaping new outcomes. Few developing country governments now expect a multilateral round to deliver the market access, sharpened rules or policy space that was expected only a few years ago.

Regional blocs, FTAs, bilateral tracks and issue-specific plurilaterals have an increasing impact on trade, and demand considerable attention, often moving faster and with higher stakes for a single economy than events at the WTO. MC14’s clearest advance came outside the consensus track: an interim plurilateral agreement on e-commerce, led by Australia, Japan and Singapore and backed by members representing about 70% of world trade, including the UK and the EU.

While not always in conflict with the WTO, these agreements reward countries that can organize, form alliances and negotiate in several venues at once–precisely the capabilities that small negotiating teams struggle to sustain–and penalizes those that cannot. These agreements can be more consequential for a given economy than a WTO round and routinely carry sharper imbalances of power. A single developing country facing a large partner or bloc across the table lacks the safety in numbers provided by a WTO coalition. The window to influence a text is real in a way it rarely is among all 166 members, but so is the exposure: a rushed or poorly prepared FTA can lock in terms for many years.

This shift is reflected in major regional groupings. For example, Asia now accounts for over half of global manufacturing output, while around 60% of Asia’s own trade is intra‑regional–far more than its trade with Europe or the US. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)’s 15 members include 10 developing countries and covers about a third of global GDP and population. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) spans 15% of global GDP and includes five developing country members. Meanwhile, by membership, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the biggest trade bloc ever involving developing countries. Other regional trade blocs and international groupings also appear likely to keep growing, often as diversification in response to US tariffs.

TAF2+ concentrated mostly on Geneva-based group delegations. This is economical to deliver but a predominantly WTO-centered model no longer corresponds to where developing countries spend their negotiating effort. While 74% of trade still takes place under most-favoured nation (MFN) terms, the WTO’s own database records 387 Regional Trade Agreements in force and notified, reflecting a dense web of preferential agreements layered over the multilateral system.

As more negotiation shifts to bilateral and regional tracks run directly from capitals, producing positions that are technically sound, anchored in domestic priorities and owned and implemented by capitals matters more going forward. 

Countries that do not negotiate face being left behind as their neighbors and competitors do so; those that engage without adequate preparation or resources risk agreeing to more than they can fulfil. Both issues point to the same need for well-resourced, independent negotiating capacity: nimbler, more adaptive, and focused on bridging the gap between national, regional and multilateral level.

On top of these changes to the trade landscape, ODA has fallen and becomes less predictable. Funding uncertainty had already made planning difficult. Constrained resources and a heightened geopolitical focus place more emphasis on choosing beneficiaries deliberately, funding them predictably enough for them to be able to plan and designing activities so that a limited spend produces capacity that lasts, rather than one-off wins. The need for trade advocacy support and a fully functioning global trading system remains, particularly one that features effective participation by developing countries. This need is starker amid an environment of declining ODA.

Six ideas for a future program

A future trade advocacy offer that remains anchored to the WTO alone would only help countries at the WTO, where influence is hardest to achieve, while leaving them unsupported where consequential deals are struck. A TAF2+ successor programme should consider this new reality while simultaneously preserving the features that made the model effective: demand-led assistance, technical independence, and practical help with genuine asymmetries of capacity.

Delivery could centre around several key principles and commitments:

1. Choose WTO country groupings explicitly.

Make selections based on need, likely impact, regional priority and fit with UK priorities, rather than continuing support for traditional groups by default. Of the 37 least developed countries in the WTO, most also sit within the 79-member Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) group, so supporting both can duplicate effort. Carefully designed choices–whether the LDC group, small island and landlocked states, climate-vulnerable economies or specific regions–would use funds where assistance is most effective and where the UK’s own priorities align. Groups need to be chosen so as not to give one an undue advantage over another. Selection could also weigh up whether a given process is likely to progress or stall, and whether the interests of a group are converging or moving apart on the issues in play.

2. Help connect Geneva to capitals.

Build support that harmonises positions between missions in Geneva and home ministries, to reach officials who never see negotiations first-hand or who would otherwise be unable to follow them. Much of this can be delivered virtually and at modest cost, through high-quality negotiation support in Geneva, including structured briefing and training, and harmonising positions with capitals by reaching multiple capital-based officials at once. Virtual negotiations and videoconferencing have become commonplace since the pandemic. Other tools such as flash meeting summaries and more detailed meeting reports on decisions, discussions and progress on specific topics could be delivered centrally for all members, rather than separately. The pay-off would be firmer national mandates, positions that reflect domestic realities, and smoother talks. This would also serve UK interests by making the countries it supports more predictable and better-organised partners. This directly addresses the “Geneva effect” and consolidates the national ownership on which durable outcomes depend. It would also build coherence between multilateralism and regional, bilateral and other levels and agreements – perhaps one of the best ways of supporting the global trading system.

3. Prioritise support for the negotiations that matter.

In an increasingly scarce funding environment, it may not be cost effective to underpin talks that remain stalled. Support should be extended to bilateral, regional and FTA processes alongside a more targeted WTO offer focused on the most dynamic areas, such as services and digital trade, with clearly stated boundaries on what will and will not be funded. Bilaterals, regionals, and FTAs are where power imbalances are sharpest and the scope for a single well-placed intervention is greatest. Developing-country negotiating efforts are already moving in that direction. A dedicated regional and bilateral window could move quickly to support FTA, regional and bilateral talks as they arise, alongside a smaller, clearly scoped WTO track. While a standing regional or bilateral window would be more expensive, it could help the UK support negotiations where they now carry most weight and could amplify British influence globally.

4. Integrate gender, equity, and social inclusion (GESI) from the start.

The GRO+ (Goals, Realities, Roles and Options) framework developed under the Cadmus-led UK Trade and Development Evidence and Innovation Programme tests whether proposed trade reforms and support measures address the actual structural constraints facing women traders, workers, and entrepreneurs (such as unpaid care and credit gaps), rather than relying on generic “gender language.” [2] GRO+ can serve as a practical checklist to ensure that every strand of UK trade advocacy–from negotiation support and outreach to Aid for Trade investments–demonstrably strengthens women’s participation in and benefit from international trade in partner countries.

5. Manage adaptively, assure quality lightly.

Budget constraints put an even greater onus on keeping layers of contractors and subcontractors to a minimum. This would also ensure that any new fund or facility was as sensitive as possible to beneficiary demand, maximising project impact and efficiencies. A tight delivery chain could be built around a monitoring system that learnt from ongoing practice rather than reporting against fixed milestones. Periodic blind expert reviews of outputs would ensure quality. A consolidated and technically-orientated project structure could improve coordination, responsiveness and adaptability. Done well, this could allow the programme to back a smaller number of higher-value engagements, test its assumptions as it goes, and catch quality problems early, without compromising the independence that recipients value.

6. Coordinate more with others active in the space.

For example, Australia’s DFAT or Global Affairs Canada. [3] Modest, well-judged visibility, making clear support is UK-funded while keeping advice independent, would widen the pool of applicants, improve targeting and strengthen the UK’s international influence on trade and development.

Conclusion

TAF2+ proved that UK trade advocacy works. Priorities have shifted rather than gone away. The structural asymmetries that keep developing countries on the back foot in negotiations are, if anything, more exposed now that the multilateral system is stalling and the consequential bargaining has shifted to faster, more unequal regional and bilateral tables. As more trade takes place between plurilaterals, regionals, blocs, and bilaterals, assistance for developing countries must evolve correspondingly. The global trading system is no longer only the WTO; it has spread into a series of interconnected agreements at different levels. Strengthening the system requires building and defending coherence and coordination. Support for developing country participation in the system can help contribute to this.

The UK can continue to lead trade advocacy support by backing a modernised offer that is better targeted, predictably funded, connected to capitals, adaptive in delivery, and willing to follow negotiations into the arenas where developing countries now win or lose most. This is a chance to do more with a constrained budget by spending it where it counts, and to ensure that a well-regarded programme continues to exert lasting UK influence on trade and development.

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Cadmus (operating as Nathan Associates prior to acquisition) has 15 years of continuous experience in trade programme delivery, from regional economic integration to country-level trade reform and capacity-building. We are currently implementing the FCDO’s Open Trade Pillar under the ASEAN UK Economic Integration Programme – Open Trade Pillar (OTp). Until its conclusion in April 2026, we implemented the Evidence & Innovation Trade and Development Programme, for which we also conducted a TAF2+ lessons learned review.

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